

# Protect your private keys with inexpensive crypto devices

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# Me

- Net/sec/sys admin since 1995
- Moved from Brazil to the US in 2012
- Production Engineer @Facebook since 2012
- Tech lead in Infrastructure Security
- Team owns several crypto services, SSH infra, etc
- 4th time presenting to MUG
  - 2008 - LTSP case study in Brazil
  - 2014 - Facebook traffic infra
  - 2016 - SSH with CA-signed certificates
  - 2018 - this talk


# Crypto devices

- AKA
  - HSM = hardware security module
  - PIV = personal identification verification
  - Smart card
  - Secure enclave
  - Token, or Crypto token
  - etc...

# Crypto devices

- Basic functionalities
  - Generate keys **without ever exposing private keys**
  - Import keys
  - Expose primitive crypto operations
    - encrypt, decrypt, sign, verify, random...
  - Support multiple ciphers
    - Asymmetric at least (RSA, DSA)
  - Authentication for operations
    - PIN, smart card, quorum (secret sharing), etc

# Asymmetric crypto



# Shapes



# Interfacing

- Software
  - PKCS#11
  - Microsoft CNG
  - Proprietary libraries
- Physical
  - USB
  - PCIe
  - NFC
  - IP (Network)

# PKCS#11

The PKCS #11 standard defines a platform-independent API to cryptographic tokens, such as hardware security modules (HSM) and smart cards...

-- Wikipedia



# Tools

- OpenSC (PKCS#11 tool set, libraries, etc)
  - <https://github.com/OpenSC/OpenSC/wiki>
- OpenSSL
- OpenSSH
- Yubico PIV Tool
  - [https://developers.yubico.com/PIV/Tools/Yubico\\_PIV\\_Tool.html](https://developers.yubico.com/PIV/Tools/Yubico_PIV_Tool.html)



# Initializing a Yubikey

```
$ yubico-piv-tool -a set-chuid
$ yubico-piv-tool -a change-pin -P 123456
$ yubico-piv-tool -a change-puk -P 12345678
$ MGMT=$(head -c 24 /dev/urandom | hexdump -v -e '/1 "%02X"')
$ echo $MGMT
$ yubico-piv-tool -a set-mgm-key -n "$MGMT"
```

# Generating key

```
$ yubico-piv-tool -a generate -s 9c -k -o pubkey.pem
$ cat pubkey.pem
$ yubico-piv-tool -a verify-pin -a selfsign-certificate -s 9c \
  -S '/CN=Marlon Dutra/' --valid-days=10957 \
  -i pubkey.pem -o cert.pem
$ openssl x509 -text -noout -in cert.pem
$ yubico-piv-tool -a import-certificate -s 9c -k -i cert.pem
```

# Testing encryption

```
$ echo "super secret message" > msg
$ openssl rsautl -encrypt -inkey pubkey.pem -pubin \
  -in msg -out msg.crypt

$ pkcs11-tool --decrypt -i msg.crypt -m RSA-PKCS
super secret message
```

# Testing signing

```
$ pkcs11-tool -s -m SHA256-RSA-PKCS -i msg -o signature
```

```
$ openssl dgst -sha256 -verify pubkey.pem -signature signature msg
```

```
Verified OK
```

# OpenSSH auth

```
$ yubico-piv-tool -a read-certificate -s 9c -K SSH  
ssh-rsa AAAAB3N...
```

- Copy&paste to `.ssh/authorized_keys` on a server

```
$ ssh -o PKCS11Provider=/usr/local/lib/opensc-pkcs11.so \  
root@your_server_hostname  
Enter PIN for 'PIV Card Holder pin (PIV_II)':
```

# OpenSSH CA

- User generates key pair and sends pubkey for CA to sign

```
$ ssh-keygen -f user
```

- CA generates a user certificate

```
$ ssh-keygen \  
-s cert.pem \  
-D /usr/local/lib/opensc-pkcs11.so \  
-I user \  
-n user \  
-V +52w \  
-z 12345 \  
user.pub
```

# OpenSSL

```
$ openssl ...
```

OpenSSL library (libssl)

key engines (OpenSC libp11)

PKCS#11 (OpenSC opensc-pkcs11.so)





# OpenSSL config

```
openssl_conf = openssl_init

[openssl_init]
engines = engine_section

[engine_section]
pkcs11 = pkcs11_section

[pkcs11_section]
engine_id = pkcs11
dynamic_path = /engines/pkcs11.dylib
MODULE_PATH = /usr/local/lib/opensc-pkcs11.so
init = 0
```

# OpenSSL CLI

```
$ openssl dgst \  
-engine pkcs11 -keyform engine -sign slot_0 \  
-sha256 -out signature msg
```


```
$ openssl dgst -sha256 -verify pubkey.pem \  
-signature signature msg
```

```
Verified OK
```

# Security

- Goals
  - Protect against key theft
  - Secure logging
  - Tamper resistance
- Non-goals
  - Key misuse

# PKI Security




- Root CA is kept offline, valid for 30+ years
- Intermediate CAs are online, shorter validity
- Root can revoke intermediates
- Root cannot be revoked
- Root compromise is a major event (read about DigiNotar)

# All command examples



[https://github.com/mfdutra/scripts/blob/master/hsm\\_talk/examples.sh](https://github.com/mfdutra/scripts/blob/master/hsm_talk/examples.sh)

# Read more



<http://a.co/5m0Jek9>



# SSH blog post



[http://bit.ly/ssh\\_fb](http://bit.ly/ssh_fb)

# Q&A